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Abstract
This paper uses county-level panel data to test the appropriateness of the ‘one size fits 
all’ reduced-form regression approach commonly used when estimating the economic 
model of crime. Empirical results provide initial evidence that previous studies, which 
restrict deterrent effects to have identical impacts across crime types, may be presenting 
statistically biased results.  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Since Becker’s (1968) introduction of the theory of crime and punishment, a plethora of empirical
tests have emerged in the literature. In a significant contribution, Cornwell and Trumbull (1994)
illustrated that much of the existing empirical evidence contains biased and inconsistent parameter
estimates from failing to properly control for unobserved heterogeneity. Cornwell and Trumbull
(hereafter CT) addressed this issue by employing panel data models to control for heterogeneity in the
unit of observation. As in previous studies, CT measured criminal activity with an overall crime index
that aggregates across individual crime types. The purpose of this paper is to extend CT’s study by
examining the effects of measuring criminal activity with an aggregated index. We conjecture that it is
inappropriate to pool crime types into a single decision model and that much of the existing empirical
evidence suffers from aggregation bias. Our empirical results verify our premise, as parameter
estimates from a disaggregated model differ significantly from the aggregate model. From a policy
perspective our results are important as we show deterrence effects of various variables, such as
probability of arrest, are quite heterogeneous across crime types.
2. Aggregation bias
The economic model of crime attempts to explain criminal activity. Empirical tests of the theory
therefore require a measure of criminal activity as the dependent variable. Many previous studies use
the crime index as an overall crime rate to measure the level of criminal activity. The index measure
generally includes seven of the eight index crimes — murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny
and auto theft, with arson typically omitted from the analysis. The FBI separates the index measure
into two broad crime types: violent (murder, rape, robbery and assault) and property (burglary,
larceny, auto theft and arson). Further disaggregation yields a crime rate for each of the eight crime
types. While previous studies have examined the deterrence hypothesis for individual crime types, to
1the authors’ best knowledge the impacts of disaggregation have yet to be explored.
Because sanctions vary systematically across crime types, estimated deterrent effects could differ
substantially across offenses. Some offenses primarily call for incarceration as the sanction (murder
and robbery), whereas others generally receive no confinement as punishment (burglary and larceny).
Similarly, the probability of arrest also varies considerably across crime types, as clearance rates are
much greater for violent crimes (0.78) than property crimes (0.22). Given that certainty measures for
each crime type are constructed with data reported by jurisdictions, our contribution is parallel to CT’s
seminal paper, which addressed jurisdictional heterogeneity. But instead of controlling for only
jurisdictional heterogeneity, we also allow parameter heterogeneity across crime types.
To empirically test the effects of aggregation, we follow CT and model the crime rate as a function
of legal opportunities and a set of deterrent variables:
C 5 a 1 bX 1 w 1 ´ i 5 1, 2, . . . , 90; t 5 1, 2, . . . , 7 (1)it i it t it
where C represents the natural logarithm of the crime rate in county i at time t, b is the unknownit
vector of K time-invariant slope coefficients, X is the vector of K exogenous factors for county i atit
time t; a are fixed effects which control for unobserved county factors that affect crime rates; w arei t
time effects that capture any relevant factors that are equivalent across North Carolina counties, such
2as macroeconomic effects, and ´ is the contemporaneous error term. Table 1 contains descriptiveit
statistics for all variables. We should note that the regressors in X are identical to those used in CT,
with one exception. Whereas CT aggregate clearance rates (probability of arrest) in an index form, we
have disaggregated data on clearance rates for each crime type. For comparability purposes, we
3restrict the present analysis to include the same time period used by CT, 1981–88.
A few noteworthy aspects of Eq. (1) warrant further discussion. First, we estimate Eq. (1)
separately for both of the FBI major crime groups — violent and property; and also estimate the
model individually for murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle. This
procedure enables us to compare our estimates from each model type with CT’s parameter estimates.
1Some studies that have estimated crime equations using disaggregated data include Swimmer (1974), Mathur (1978),
Avio and Clark (1978), and Sjoquist (1973), amongst others.
2Following CT, we also use the natural logarithm of the variables in the X vector. We should note that some of the
county-level crime rates are equal to 0. We added one to each crime rate before taking the logarithm to account for this
nuance.
3CT generously provided their data for estimation purposes.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean S.D.
Crime rate
Index 0.0316 0.0181
Violent 0.0008 0.0017
Property 0.0090 0.0090
Murder 0.0001 0.0001
Rape 0.0002 0.0001
Burglary 0.0004 0.0005
Assault 0.0003 0.0003
Robbery 0.0093 0.0050
Larceny 0.0170 0.0110
Auto theft 0.0010 0.0009
Probability of arrest (P )a
Index 0.309 0.17
Violent 0.781 0.65
Property 0.221 0.77
Murder 0.987 0.45
Rape 0.741 0.99
Robbery 0.607 0.44
Assault 0.839 0.53
Burglary 0.226 0.36
Larceny 0.211 0.85
Auto theft 0.228 0.96
Probability of conviction (P ) 0.689 1.690c
Probability of imprisonment (P ) 0.426 0.087p
Sentence length (S) 8.955 2.658
Police 0.00192 0.00273
Density 1.386 1.440
Young male 0.089 0.024
WCON 245.67 121.98
WTUC 406.10 266.51
WTRD 192.82 88.41
WFIR 272.06 55.78
WSER 224.67 104.87
WMFG 285.17 82.36
WFED 403.90 63.07
WSTA 296.91 53.43
WLOC 257.98 41.36
Second, to estimate the violent and property crime models, we stack the crime data and estimate a
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model assuming the response coefficients are homogenous
within each of the two major crime types. Note that we do not assume the fixed/ random effects are
equivalent across crime types. Hence, we allow a to vary across crime types within each regressioni
model. This allows a more direct test of the relationship between each different crime rate and the
regressors. Third, a general concern in estimation of Eq. (1) is whether the effects a should bei
considered fixed or random. If they are assumed fixed, Eq. (1) is the within estimator and if they are
assumed random, the random effects model, which accounts for between and within variation, results.
The important consideration is whether the effects and the regressors are nonorthogonal. If they are,
the random effects model returns inconsistent estimates. Alternatively, if the effects are orthogonal to
the regressors, the random effects model should be used since the intercounty variation in crime rates
is taken into account and, therefore, coefficient estimates are more efficient than the alternative within
the model. Eq. (1) suggests a fixed effects formulation, in that the effects are most likely correlated
with the deterrence variables. Indeed, for all regressions, a Hausman (1978) test rejects the random
effects formulation in favor of the fixed effects model. Therefore, we direct our discussion of
4aggregation bias using the within estimates.
3. Empirical results
Empirical results in Table 2 include CT’s original within estimates in column 1 and our fixed
effects estimates, which decrease in the level of aggregation from left to right. In columns 2 and 3 we
aggregate crime types into violent and property crime groups and estimate Eq. (1) for the pooled data.
Table 2
Estimated crime functions of aggregate and individual crime measures with time and jurisdiction effects
Index Violent Property Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Auto
P 20.355 20.284 20.413 20.327 20.340 20.167 20.421 20.557 20.527 20.313a
(0.032) (0.022) (0.016) (0.054) (0.045) (0.038) (0.043) (0.031) (0.029) (0.026)
P 20.282 20.194 20.214 20.028 20.111 20.131 20.546 20.265 20.249 20.169c
(0.021) (0.026) (0.019) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.030) (0.029) (0.040)
P 20.173 20.115 20.085 20.100 20.186 0.051 20.229 20.240 20.132 0.044p
(0.032) (0.048) (0.036) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.092) (0.054) (0.054) (0.074)
S 20.00245 0.104 20.007 0.119 0.119 0.096 0.0807 20.036 0.016 0.001
(0.0231) (0.041) (0.031) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.046) (0.045) (0.062)
Police 0.413 20.200 20.367 20.157 20.230 20.281 20.119 20.393 20.395 20.250
(0.027) (0.039) (0.030) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.045) (0.044) (0.060)
Density 0.414 20.090 0.166 20.410 21.225 1.502 20.334 0.412 0.300 20.388
(0.283) (0.439) (0.330) (0.862) (0.847) (0.850) (0.840) (0.491) (0.485) (0.671)
Young 0.627 1.081 1.433 20.662 3.621 20.198 0.994 0.305 1.813 2.053
Male (0.364) (0.566) (0.428) (1.108) (1.093) (1.097) (1.089) (0.636) (0.626) (0.875)
N 2520 1890 630 630 630 630 630 630 630
F 64.61 150.35 4.05 11.08 23.46 23.06 55.01 74.85 28.27
(P-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
2R̄ 0.906 0.959 0.352 0.642 0.800 0.797 0.906 0.929 0.829
ln L 21215.65 298.06 2279.67 2271.12 2273.09 2265.25 71.62 80.38 2124.15
Standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise noted; both jurisdiction and time effects were controlled for in the
estimation leading to a two-way effects specification; wage variables provided in Table 1 were included in each of the
models. Coefficient estimates are available upon request.
4Given that CT conclude that a model more intricate than a within estimator is unnecessary, we do not estimate models
that account for simultaneity.
The results illustrate the impact of aggregation with some intuitively appealing parameter estimate
variations across the disaggregated models. Specifically, the estimated deterrent effect of probability
of arrest, P , is 45% greater for property crimes versus violent crimes, a difference that is significantlya
different from zero at the P,0.05 level. This differential is even more pronounced in the
disaggregated crime types as the estimated effect of P is 55% greater for burglary and larceny thana
murder and rape. While the aggregation that remains in our data prohibits any specific interpretation,
the deviation in P follows the characterization that murder and rape are crimes of passion, anda
sanctions are less influential in deterring these types of offenses.
Coefficient estimates of the remaining variables also vary considerably across models; however, the
impact of aggregation on police is striking. Disaggregation appears to reverse the estimated
relationship between police per capita and crime rates. Whereas CT’s model carries the typical
incorrect positive sign on police, our disaggregated models indicate the theoretically correct inverse
relationship. Whether disaggregation actually curtails the simultaneity between police and crime rates
may be questioned, but the results do indicate the importance of disaggregation in this setting.
To formally test for differences across aggregation levels, we employ a likelihood-ratio test.
Considering the aggregation of violent crimes, we find that murder, rape, robbery, and assault should
2not be pooled in one regression (x 5252) at the P,0.01 level. Rather the global test of parameter
homogeneity suggests that the estimated parameters differ significantly across violent crime types. A
similar result arises when considering the aggregation of property crimes. Parameter homogeneity
2across property crimes is also rejected soundly (x 5250), implying that property crimes should not
be pooled at the P,0.01 level. These results suggest that previous empirical estimates in the literature
that impose isomorphic effects of deterrence and economic variables on reducing crime may be
presenting erroneous estimates.
CT’s original contribution concerned the role jurisdictional heterogeneity has in estimating
deterrent elasticities with aggregate data. In a similar spirit, we re-estimate Eq. (1) excluding the fixed
effects, a . Empirical estimates (available upon request) largely support the original findings in CT —i
ignoring jurisdictional heterogeneity will lead to an over-estimate of the deterrent effect. These results
also provide additional evidence regarding the importance of aggregation because the deterrent effects
are over-estimated to a larger extent in the ‘loosely’ reported regression models (burglary and
robbery) relative to the tightly reported crimes such as murder. This is intuitively appealing because
jurisdictional heterogeneity will be greater in loosely reported crimes than tightly reported offenses.
4. Concluding remarks
Numerous empirical and theoretical efforts on crime have been carried out since Becker’s (1968)
seminal paper over three decades ago. On the empirical side, use of aggregate crime data has been
chastised, but the main criticisms have not hindered policymakers from using the important results
(see, e.g. Blumstein et al., 1978). The value of our note is not only to make academics and public
policymakers aware of the potential aggregation bias, but also give an indication of the degree of bias
associated with aggregation.
Our major finding, that deterrent effects have heterogeneous impacts across crime types, does not
serve to indict those who have used the isomorphic regression model to test the model of crime.
Rather, it merely illustrates that past empirical results should be interpreted with caution given the
potential of inconsistent and biased parameter estimates due to aggregation. Our result is particularly
alarming given that one would expect if any cross-sections would have identical regression parameters
it would be counties within one U.S. state, which are much more homogenous than samples of states
and countries.
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